1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8		EEDINGS PURSUANT TO	
9	In the Matter of the Arbitration between) GRIEVANTS' CLOSING BRIEF	
10	CASE (All Affected),)	
11	Grievants,	CalHR No.: 22-02-0004	
12	vs.	Arbitration Dates: November 7, 2023 November 30, 2023	
13	CALIFORNIA PUBLIC EMPLOYEES	November 30, 2023 February 7, 2024	
14	RETIREMENT SYSTEM,)))	
15	Respondent.	ý)	
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GRIEVANTS' CLOSING BRIEF

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1	ISSUE STATEMENTS
2	The parties agreed upon the following issue statements.
3	1. Is the grievance timely?
4	2. Did CASE make a valid "employee request" to telework, pursuant to section 6.4 of the 2021-
5	2022 BU2 MOU, such that the rights and obligations of section 6.4 were triggered?
6	3. If so, was CalPERS's denial of CASE's request based on operational needs, as required by
7	section 6.4 (Telework) of the 2021-2022 BU2 MOU?
8	4. Did CalPERS violate section 3.1 (State's Rights) by allegedly failing to uniformly apply its
9	telework policy to all similarly situated employees?
10	5. What remedy, if any, is appropriate under the MOU?
11	$(RT 8-9.)^1$
12	PROCEDURAL HISTORY
13	On March 7, 2022, after virtually all attorneys at CalPERS had been working successfully
14	from home during the COVID-19 pandemic, CASE sent a letter to CalPERS CEO Marcie Frost
15	objecting to the previously announced mandate that all CalPERS employees, including all BU2
16	members employed at CalPERS, work in the office a minimum of three days per week. (J1, pp
۱7	32-34.) ² CASE urged CalPERS to reconsider the in-office mandate. (J1, p. 34.)
18	On March 17, 2022, CalPERS responded, noting that it "appreciate[s] the request to
19	expand telework for the attorneys," but nevertheless denied CASE's request. (J1, p. 36.) CalPERS
20	twice asserted in the letter that it would re-evaluate the in-office mandate "over the next 12
21	months." (J1, pp. 35, 36.) CalPERS stated the reevaluations were to ensure the mandate "supports
22	the goals and objectives of CalPERS" and "meets the operational needs of" CalPERS' business
23	objectives. (Ibid.) However, after more than 12 months, the three-day-in-office mandate remains
24	in place. (RT 444.)
25 26 27 28	Citations to the Reporter's Transcript in this case follow the following convention: "RT' followed by the page number. Although there are three volumes of reporter's transcripts in this case (one for each day of arbitration) they are paginated consecutively. Citations to exhibits follow the following convention: The letter "J" (for Joint Exhibits), "U" (for Union's Exhibits) or "R" (for Respondent's Exhibits, followed by the exhibit number
20	followed by a page number. Thus, J1, pp. 32-34 refers to Joint Exhibit 1, pages 32 through 34.

On March 22, 2022, CASE filed the instant grievance. (J1, p. 2.) The grievance requested as a remedy, inter alia, that "CalPERS attorneys be allowed to telework as much as possible and only be required to go into the office when necessary." (J1, pp. 8-9.)

On April 21, 2022, CalPERS denied the grievance in a letter from CalPERS General Counsel Matt Jacobs. (J1, p. 40.) The denial recognized that section 6.4 of the MOU required CalPERS to set forth operational needs when denying telework requests, but claimed that "management determines those operational needs." (J1, p. 41.) The denial then purported to set forth various operational needs, including "the need to improve and maintain CalPERS' culture" (J1, p. 42), "the need to maintain and increase collaboration" (J1, p. 43), "the need to maintain productivity" (J1, p. 45), "the need to assimilate new team members" (J1, p. 46), and "the need to have the same requirements apply to all team members." (J1, pp. 46-47.)

This matter was originally set for arbitration on March 2 and 3, 2023, before a different arbitrator. On or about January 31, 2023, the State suddenly refused to participate in a number of previously scheduled arbitrations all raising similar issues, including this one. The March 2-3 dates were vacated and CASE instituted proceedings in superior court to compel arbitration. (U15.) After several months, on June 28, 2023, the superior court found that this matter was arbitrable. (U15.)³ However, the delay caused by the State's intransigence required many of the previously scheduled arbitrations to be cancelled or rescheduled months later. This matter was set for arbitration November 7, 2023, before the instant arbitrator by mutual agreement of the Parties.

On October 9, 2023, per Arbitrator Thomson's subpoena policy, CASE emailed a Subpoena Duces Tecum (SDT) to her for her review and approval. Arbitrator Thompson approved the Grievants' SDT, in its entirety, the same day.

On October 10, 2023, CASE served the SDT on Respondent's custodian of records through its counsel, Mr. Villalba. The SDT requested the custodian of records to appear in person and produce documents on the first day of the arbitration. However, the SDT stated that the custodian of records did not have to appear in person if the documents were produced earlier, but

³ The State appealed the decision, but the appeal was summarily denied.

no later than October 27, 2023. Instead of producing documents by the October 27, 2023, deadline, Respondent filed a Motion to Quash the SDT. The motion contained 3 documents purportedly responsive to a few of the 20 Requests and even those productions were incomplete. The SDT requested certain documents for a timeframe of January 1, 2020, to the present (October 2023), however, only current documents were produced. For example, Request A requested Respondent's organizational charts for its Legal Office. Respondent produced a current organizational chart, dated October 2023, but did not produce organizational charts for calendar years 2020, 2021, 2022.

On October 30, 2023, Grievants filed its Opposition to the Motion to Quash. Arbitrator Thomson ruled on the motion that same day. Grievants' Requests E, M and I were quashed in their entirety. Requests J and K were partially quashed but only if responsive documents were confidential. Arbitrator Thomson's ruling concluded by stating "The Employer has had weeks to comply with the subpoena and must comply promptly."

On November 2, 2023, Respondent provided its written response to the SDT and also produced nine (9) Commute Reports and one (1) report regarding certain teleworking statistics. However as set forth below, it is clear that the production was incomplete and responsive documents existed but were not produced.

Notwithstanding the failure of Respondent to produce necessary documents, this matter proceeded to arbitration on November 7, 2023, with additional hearing days on November 30, 2023, and February 7, 2024. The Parties agreed to submit simultaneous closing briefs. (RT 525-526.)

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Austa Wakily, an attorney at CalPERS, testified that in March of 2020 when COVID struck, everybody was ordered home to work fully remote. (RT 26.) Prior to COVID, teleworking for attorneys was not infrequent, but was not full-time. (RT 25-26.) Ms. Wakily chose to work in the office as the environment at home at the time was not conducive to full-time telework. (RT 27.) Most of the other attorneys worked from home for approximately two years. (RT 27.)

Now, while all attorneys have to be in the office three days per week, each attorney is allowed to choose the days. (RT 28-29.) When Ms. Wakily is in the office, sometimes it is empty, and sometimes there are other colleagues present. But she generally just closes the door to her office and does her work without much personal interaction with her colleagues. (RT 29-30.)

Even when in the office she communicates with colleagues via phone or email. (RT 30.) At the weekly staff meetings, some people attend in person, others attend virtually by Zoom. (RT 30-31.) She believes the staff meetings are just as effective in hybrid form as they were prior to the pandemic. (RT 32.)

All her work is solo, meaning there is no co-counsel. She is assigned her own caseload with no other attorneys assigned. (RT 24-25.)

When she was hired in 2016, attorney turnover and vacancies at CalPERS were very rare. (RT 32.) When the return-to-office mandate was announced, vacancies soared. (RT 33.) CalPERS Legal lost eight attorneys out of a total of about 25. (RT 33.) The level of attrition was unprecedented. (RT 34.) Every one of her colleagues that left told her that the telework policy was a factor in their decision to leave. (RT 34.) There was also severe attrition in the non-attorney staff, which did not happen prior to COVID. (RT 35.) The attorneys who left were often the more senior attorneys with years of experience with the Public Employees' Retirement Law (PERL.) (RT 36.) Between the loss of experienced attorneys, and the loss of non-attorney program staff, the work for the attorneys who remain is a lot more complicated and voluminous. (RT 37.)

Prior to the pandemic, CalPERS was a "destination employer." (RT 24.) Now, morale is very low as many employees are unhappy with the in-office requirement. (RT 38.) Several attorneys left CalPERS specifically because of the return-to-office mandate. (RT 67-68.)

Currently, the vacancy rate is so high that they have had to send a fair amount of work to the Attorney General's Office, which they did not have to do prior to COVID. (RT 39-40.) Using the Attorney General's Office became necessary due to the vacancies at CalPERS, and the Deputy Attorneys General ("DAGs") there were doing the same work as the attorneys at CalPERS. (RT 40-41.) However, since the DAGs are not familiar with the PERL, the CalPERS attorneys spend a

lot of time consulting with the DAGs on the outsourced cases, in addition to working on their own cases. (RT 41-42.) Yet all of the DAGs are teleworking full-time, meaning CalPERS lost attorneys coinciding with the return-to-office mandate, and is now sending work over to the Attorney General to be done by attorneys teleworking full time. (RT 42; 128-129.)

During COVID, the message from Marcie Frost and management generally was that productivity was up during the period of remote work; there were no messages indicating a loss in productivity. (RT 53.) Attorneys were repeatedly told that remote work was working well with no problems. (RT 144-145.)

Ms. Wakily was initially skeptical that full time remote work would actually work, but she was happy to learn that productivity increased, and CEO Frost confirmed that during multiple webchats. (RT 54-55.) Ms. Wakily believes that the return-to-office mandate has had a very negative effect on CalPERS. (RT 60.)

Ms. Wakily did not perceive any additional benefit in terms of collaborating with her colleagues whether it was in person or via email. (RT 62-63.) Now that she is one of the more experienced attorneys, newer attorneys ask her questions, typically via email rather than in person. (RT 64-65.) In her experience, meeting with clients in-person is the same as via Zoom, and in fact has benefits in light of the fact that the hearings are virtual. (RT 65.) The attorneys would socialize outside the office during COVID and remote work. (RT 48-49.)

David Van Der Griff is an Attorney V at CalPERS, working there since 2011. (RT 92.) He mostly worked in the office during COVID when everyone else was working remotely. (RT 93.) His legal work is mostly solo, but when he does need to consult with colleagues, he can do so by Zoom, phone, or email. (RT 94-95.) His interaction was not negatively impacted by not seeing his colleagues in person. (RT 95.) He does not interact with members of the public in his job. (RT 95-96.) There are more attorney vacancies now at CalPERS than ever before in his tenure. (RT 98-99.) Several attorneys in his unit left specifically because of the return-to-office policy. (RT 107-109.)

John Shipley was an attorney at CalPERS from 2015 to 2023. (RT 113.) His work at CalPERS was mostly solo. (RT 114-115.) When COVID hit he worked from home for about two

years. (RT 117-118.) He left CalPERS primarily due to the telework policy and went to work at another State agency with more flexible remote work options. (RT 118.) He regularly mentored younger attorneys, and his ability to do so was not affected by remote work, because even before COVID, he would often communicate via phone or email rather than in person. (RT 120-121.) During the two years of remote work, where he never saw colleagues in person, he had no difficulties in completing his work. (RT 124-125.) CalPERS' office-centric policy did not have a positive effect on recruitment and retention, because the department lost a lot of really good employees because of it. (RT 152.) CalPERS had only 3 vacant attorney positions out of 28 in March of 2020, but the vacancies rose to 10 positions in August, 2023, after the return-to-office mandate had been imposed. (RT 204-205; U14.)

CASE President Tim O'Connor testified that of the more than 100 departments that employ attorneys for the State, only about 10 of those have in office mandates. (RT 170-171.) Mr. O'Connor reviewed several articles from various industry publications discussing the fact that allowing employees to work remotely promoted diversity, morale, and employee's sense of well-being. (RT 176-183; U9-U12.)

The Parties stipulated that Rama Maline, if called to testify, would state that all 1100 Deputy Attorneys General at DOJ are permitted to work fully remotely, and further that DOJ bills client agencies like CalPERS \$220 per hour for attorney services. (RT 520, U19.)

Justin Delacruz worked briefly at CalPERS in 2022. (RT 192.) He left because he thought he would be able to telework but was instead required to be in the office full-time. (RT 193-196.)

CalPERS General Counsel Matt Jacobs interpreted the grievance as requesting full-time telework for the attorneys. (RT 221-222.) He reiterated the operational needs set forth in his April 21, 2022, letter. (RT 223.) With regard to culture, he claimed that it involved everyone having the same mission, and also claimed that he wanted his team to have high ethical standards. (RT 223.) He also claimed that "culture" involved ensuring that his attorneys to treated adversaries with the utmost respect. (RT 223-224.) He claimed that team bonds weakened while people were working fully remotely, due to a lack of physical contact. (RT 224.)

However, he acknowledged that there was no way to quantitatively measure whether

CalPERS employees have a common sense of mission. (RT 255.) Instead, he claimed it was based on management's "sense" and "inputs from [] team members about the extent to which they are working together." (RT 256.) He admitted that during the two years of fully remote work, from March 2020 through March 2022, he never communicated to his attorneys that he had noticed a deterioration in the collective sense of mission. (RT 256-257.) Neither did he believe that ethical standards suffered during that same two-year period. (RT 257.) He also admitted that he had no knowledge that his attorneys were not treating adversaries with respect. (RT 258.) With regard to weakening bonds, he also admitted that he was unaware of how frequently his team members communicated with each other during the pandemic but claimed that in-person communication was qualitatively better than telephone, email, and Zoom calls. (RT 258-259.)

He also admitted when the attorneys returned to the office three days per week, he saw no improvement in ethical standards, and no change in the respect given to adversaries (RT 260.)

With regard to collaboration, he acknowledged that most of the work done by the attorneys was solo, but that what was left was collaborative work. (RT 260-261.) However, he acknowledged that collaboration could be done on a virtual platform like Zoom or Teams, but claimed that the communication on such platform was not as good. (RT 261-262.) Specifically, he acknowledged that attorneys could collaborate over Zoom, over email and over the telephone. (RT 275-276.) However, he claimed the "volume" of collaboration was not as high, although he was unable to specify how much worse it was than in person. (RT 276.) Also, with regard to collaboration, he claimed that CalPERS' work was very complex, and collaboration was very important. (RT 225-227.) He claimed both the quantity and quality of collaboration suffered during full-time telework. (RT 227-228.)

He admitted that his litigation attorneys conduct hearings over Zoom with the Office of Administrative Hearings, and further admitted that the "large majority" of the hearings are virtual rather than in-person. (RT 277-278.)

With regard to the difference between in-person meetings, and Zoom meetings, he acknowledged that often before the in-person meeting starts, people will chit-chat with each other. Yet, he never tried to incorporate that into the Zoom meetings. (RT 280.) He also never tried to

have his team members talk to each other over Zoom without him being present. (RT 280-281.) Although he claimed that some people appeared uninvolved during zoom meetings, he never adopted strategies to get them more involved. (RT 281-282.)

Despite claiming to want to replicate causal conversations that occur when popping into a colleague's office, he admitted that he never tried to replicate that on Zoom by, for example, asking about a colleague's cat when it appeared on screen, as he might do if they were both in the office. (RT 285-287.) He claimed it was difficult to do such things on Zoom, and that he was mostly focused on moving through his agenda. (RT 286-287.)

He claimed that a "social norm developed" where people didn't just pick up the phone and call a colleague, and thus there was no analog to just popping into someone's office. (RT 228.) However, he admitted that he never did anything to try to break that social norm, like calling attorneys at random just to simulate popping into their office. (RT 282-283.)

He also claimed physical presence was necessary in order for people to observe facial expressions, body language, and tone of voice. (RT 229.) He also claimed that since the return-to-office mandate, collaboration had increased, but he admitted that it was not back to prepandemic levels due to not everyone being in the office at the same time. (RT 231-232.)

He admitted he never encouraged his attorneys to make more use of group emails to ask questions of the whole group. (RT 284-285.)

With regard to productivity, Mr. Jacobs claimed that uniform policies lead to a better product, and a better product means better productivity. (RT 232-233.) He admitted he had no metrics showing there was a decrease in productivity in the legal office. (RT 287.) He had no quantitative evidence of any decrease in productivity. (RT 324.)

With regard to assimilating new team members, he claimed that training and mentoring suffered during full-time telework. (RT 233-234.) However, he admitted that the mentoring and information exchange could be done over the phone or via Zoom. (RT 288.)

With regard to having the same policies apply to all team members, he claimed that it was important for all team members to be treated "fairly and equally." (RT 235). He also observed that during the pandemic, "there was a lot of grumbling from the support staff" about the fact that

the attorneys were allowed to work remotely. (RT 236.)⁴ Matt Jacobs asked the CEO to provide an extra day of telework to the attorneys, because he was losing attorneys as a result of the three-day-in-office mandate. (RT 239.) He also recognized that the morale of the attorneys was suffering. (RT 240-241.) CEO Frost denied the request based on "fairness," i.e. the idea that if an exception was made for attorneys, other units might make similar requests. (RT 241.) Mr. Jacobs explained that he needed to give deference to his clients "desires and needs." (RT 242.) And he later admitted that there was a difference between a "want" and a "need." (RT 318.) Mr. Jacobs was unable to explain how he could value consistency in having the same rule apply to all team members, while at the same time asking CEO Frost for an extra day of telework just for the attorneys, but he did admit that he believed CalPERS' operational needs could be met with giving the attorneys more telework. (RT 303-306.)

He acknowledged that there were several units in CalPERS that were allowed to continue

He acknowledged that there were several units in CalPERS that were allowed to continue working fully remotely even after the return-to-office mandate was applied to everyone else. Two were units of 14 people in the IT section. (RT 237-238.) Another was the call center (RT 238-239.) As to the IT personnel, he claimed their permission to work fully remotely was due to a misunderstanding, that it predated COVID-19, but that CalPERS failed to correct that misunderstanding after the pandemic, even though CalPERS was ordering all other employees back into the office after working fully remotely for two years. (RT 289-290.) As for the call center personnel who were allowed to work remotely, Mr. Jacobs acknowledged that it was because their job was particularly suited to remote work, but also acknowledged that a lot of attorney work could be done remotely, and in fact had been done remotely for two years during the pandemic. (RT 292-293.)

He acknowledged that CalPERS is getting fewer applications for attorney positions currently than they have historically. (RT 306-307.) He also acknowledged that the amount of legal work being sent to the DOJ was increased compared to prior to the pandemic. (RT 307.) He claimed that it was an operational need to send legal work to DOJ even though the DOJ attorneys

⁴ The support staff were coming into the office during the pandemic which created a sense of unfairness and low morale. (RT 386-387.)

5

Mr. Jacobs reviewed several articles that he believed supported CalPERS' denial of CASE's grievance. (RT 247.) However, he acknowledged that these articles were not considered by CalPERS in formulating the in-office mandate; rather he researched and found those articles specifically to support his client's decision to deny CASE's grievance. (RT 324-325.) Moreover, he rejected any articles that were favorable to CASE's position. (RT 326.)

Although the articles suggested that employers should employ scientific methodology to define shared culture, he was unable to identify any such methodology used by CalPERS to define its culture. (RT 327-328.) Nor was he able to identify "baselines" for CalPERS' culture as suggested by the articles. (RT 328.) However, he did mention an employee survey but acknowledged it did not show any deterioration in culture. (RT 328-329.) He later claimed the employee survey established a baseline but could not say what it was. (RT 329-330.) He ultimately acknowledged that he did not cite the employee survey when denying the grievance, because it "didn't seem relevant." (RT 352.) When questioned about other threshold recommendations from the various articles he relied upon, he repeatedly referenced the employee survey, but was unable to provide any details about it. (RT 330-331.) Another article was a study of the effects of telework on interns, but Mr. Jacobs acknowledged that CalPERS does not employ any interns. (RT 332-333.) Another article was a study of IT workers in a foreign country in Asia, which he conceded were different than attorneys working in California. (RT 334-335.)

Ultimately, Mr. Jacobs believed that bonds could be formed over virtual platforms, but that such bonds just are not quite as strong as they would be in person. (RT 297-299.) He acknowledged that not a single attorney had been disciplined during the two-year fully remote period of the pandemic. (RT 301.)

Deputy General Counsel Renee Salazar claimed there was an "intangible quality" of inperson communication that could not be replicated with other means of communication. (RT 368, 372, 403-404.) She claimed that an email from Mr. Jacobs to the legal unit congratulating them on "another amazingly productive year" at the end of 2021 was not really a reflection on productivity, because it was meant only to help morale. (RT 384-385; U1.) After extolling the

virtues of in-person interaction she acknowledged that because the attorneys were not in the office on the same three days per week, they often still had to schedule time to meet with their colleagues on a mutually convenient day. (RT 393.) She also acknowledged that there are still lots of Zoom calls and telephone calls between colleagues even though the in-office mandate has been in place for two years. (RT 394.)

Despite bemoaning the lack of interaction during the pandemic, she admitted she never directed her attorneys to engage in regular communication to help replace the loss of in-person interaction. (RT 406.) Although she claimed that the quality of legal writing deteriorated, she never gave any specific examples and later clarified that it just meant she had to edit some documents; it was not enough to give any attorneys a counseling memo. (RT 408.)

Labor Relations Manager Julie Morgan testified about various meet and confer sessions in 2021 and early 2022 between CalPERS and CASE in which CASE requested that the CalPERS attorneys be allowed to telework as much as possible. (RT 420, 423-424, 427.) Ms. Morgan did not consider the March 7, 2022, letter from CASE to be an employee request for telework, because it did not follow CalPERS' internal procedures. (RT 428-429.) However, she also acknowledged that CalPERS had failed to follow the its own policy when deciding to mandate all job classifications to return to the office three days per week without doing a job-specific analysis. (RT 435-437.)

She acknowledged that none of the CalPERS attorneys were able to benefit from the \$50 per month stipend for remote centered workers that had been negotiated between CASE and the State. (RT 444-445; see J3.) She acknowledged that she told the Department of General Services that CalPERS did not suffer any loss in productivity due to telework as of September 30, 2022. (RT 450-452.) She never communicated to DGS that full-time telework was not working at CalPERS. (RT 463.)

CalPERS CEO Marcie Frost claimed that she knew that the decision to impose a three-day-per-week-in-office mandate would cause employees to leave. (RT 477-478.) She stated that she denied General Counsel Matt Jacobs' request for an additional day of telework for the attorneys because she did not see any way in which attorneys were distinct from other employees.

(RT 480-481.) She does not believe collaboration can occur via virtual platforms. (RT 484-485.) She believes collaboration must occur sitting in a room together. (RT 485-486.)

Ms. Frost previously stated in a web chat that she "would not be comfortable" with full-time telework. (U6, p. 14.) However, she acknowledged that as CEO, she had to make decisions that make her uncomfortable. (RT 486.) She acknowledged CalPERS did not do an analysis of each job classification to determine its suitability for telework and was not aware of anyone at CalPERS who did. (RT 489.)

She claimed that there were limitations to her ability to communicate with team members during the two years of the pandemic. (RT 493.) She acknowledged that she could call people working at home but claimed that because the work at CalPERS was unique, calling people was not the "same experience." However, she ultimately admitted that remote forms of communication do indeed work. (RT 493.) She claimed that telephone, email, text, and virtual platforms were worse than in-person communication but could not describe how. (RT 494-495.)

CEO Frost was asked to name one operational need that suffered during the pandemic, and though she said a lot of words, she failed to articulate a single operational need that was not met while attorneys were working fully remotely. (RT 495-498.)

She characterized her web chats as town halls. (RT 498.) She claimed that when she said in a web chat that the numbers were positive, and productivity was up, she was really only referring to a portion of the organization, even though she did not say anything to limit it in any way. (RT 499-502.) Similarly, when she said in another web chat that CalPERS was hitting all of its performance targets, and that productivity was high, she was only talking about part of the organization. (RT 502-504.) She also acknowledged previously saying that she knew full-time telework worked for half of the organization, and believed it worked for the other half. (RT 506-507.) Despite being asked about how the productivity for attorneys dropped during the pandemic, she was unable to identify any metric, or even any example, other than to state that productivity is different during a health pandemic. (RT 508-511.) She acknowledged previously stating that CalPERS policies might be different than other State departments, but assured her employees that they would not be so different as to hurt recruitment and retention. (RT 513.)

ARGUMENT

I. RESPONDENT FAILED TO PRODUCE DOCUMENTS CAUSING PREJUDICE TO CASE

Notwithstanding the arbitrator's clear and unequivocal ruling on the Motion to Quash, CalPERS nevertheless refused to provide all the documents to which CASE was entitled. The failures as to each request in the SDT are detailed below.

Request A CalPERS' organizational chart for its Legal Office.

Response Respondent produced the current organizational chart dated October 2023.

Argument The SDT specifically requested documents for the time period of January 1, 2020 present (October 2023). Respondent failed to produce its organizational charts for 3 calendar years - 2020 through 2022. Grievants were seeking organizational charts for past years to compare and assess vacancy rates in the Legal Office over the course of those years.

Request H Any and all documents evidencing CalPERS' telework program maintained or improved "employee productivity" in accordance with the Policy.

Response No responsive documents.

Argument Austa Wakily and John Shipley testified about a Service Level Agreement (SLA), which is an agreement that was implemented by legal management. It is an agreement between the CalPERS Legal Office and its various program clients. Essentially it is an internal deadline system so that the Legal Office sets an appeal hearing within 120 days of receiving a referral from its program client. The SLA is a tracking system that keeps track of the percentage of deadlines being met which directly correlates to the Legal Office's productivity (Wakily, Vol. 1, 43:22 – 47:16 and Shipley, Vol. 1, 121:6-20.)

Wakily and Shipley testified about KPI's. Ms. Wakily could not recall exactly what the acronym stood for, and Mr. Shipley could not recall what the "K" stood for but recalled the "PI" was for performance index. However, both witnesses understood, and testified that it was a way to monitor the productivity of the Legal Office (Wakily, Vol. 1, 50:16-25 and Shipley, Vol. 1, 148:4-24.)

Response

28 Response

Request S

No responsive documents.

productivity as a result of its telework program.

The Department of General Services ("DGS") maintains a Statewide Telework Dashboard. This dashboard contains statistical information for each State department regarding their telework programs. On a monthly basis, each State Department was required to submit data to DGS. CASE submitted a Public Records Act request to DGS requesting documents that contained Respondent's telework data. DGS produced several documents including but not limited to emails, commute information, and telework data. Several of these documents were not produced by Respondent including a document called Telework Program Evaluation Survey. Mr. Whalen asked witness Julie Morgan about this document during her cross-examination. This document, a survey, asks questions regarding the Respondent's implementation of telework. One of the questions asked was if Respondent's productivity changed by implementing telework. Respondent's response was that productivity had not changed and that it was the same amount of productivity as a result of implementing telework. This document, and several others obtained by CASE via its Public Records Act request, were not produced by Respondent.

Request L Any and all documents created by or originating from CalPERS' Telework Coordinator that evidence the reporting of metrics to ascertain the effectiveness of its telework

program, in accordance with and required by the Policy.

Produced DGS reports for December 2022 through September 2023.

Argument The argument for this request is the same as the argument in Request H above.

Request R Any and all documents created by or originating from CalPERS indicating the measures or metrics used to determine productivity, in accordance with and required by the Policy.

Response No responsive documents.

Argument The argument for this request is the same as the argument in Request H above.

Any and all documents created by or originating from CalPERS indicating the

Further, during the cross-examination of Matthew Jacobs ("Jacobs"), he testified about the existence of an "engagement survey" that is used to establish a baseline culture at CalPERS. Mr. Whalen requested that Jacobs provide the survey to Mr. Villalba. Jacobs stated that he would talk to Mr. Villalba and Human Resources. In response, Mr. Whalen said "Look forward to it." (RT 330-331.) The testimony and Mr. Whalen's response presumably inferred that a copy of the survey would be provided to CASE, or CASE would be informed if Respondent objected to its production. Arbitrator Thomson also questioned Jacobs regarding the engagement survey (RT 351-352.) During an off the record discussion, Mr. Whalen argued that the engagement survey may have been responsive to the SDT. CASE has heard nothing further from Respondent about the engagement survey and none has been produced.

The fact that Respondent did not produce all responsive documents and still has not produced further documents per the Arbitrator's ruling and instruction during off record discussion on November 30, 2023, make it clear that Respondent is playing games. Arbitrator Thomson, in one instance, also made mention of "gameplaying" when Mr. Whalen attempted to move into evidence Union Exhibit 3, which is the response by CalPERS to a Public Records Act request from CASE. Mr. Villalba argued there was a lack of foundation regarding Exhibit 3. Arbitrator Thomson stated the exhibit was a "CalPERS' response." Mr. Villalba then responded that he did not know if it was or if it wasn't. After some discussion, Arbitrator Thomson told Mr. Villalba that he should know whether or not this came from the State, and that she found that to be "game playing" (RT 352-354.)

CASE lost the opportunity to obtain relevant evidence, to review that evidence prior to the arbitration, and to share that evidence with its witnesses. Although there is no remedy at this late date that can ameliorate CalPERS' failure to comply with the subpoena, the arbitrator should nevertheless draw an adverse inference from CalPERS' misconduct. If a party "fails to produce evidence that would naturally have been produced he must take the risk that the trier of the fact will infer, and properly so, that the evidence, had it been produced, would have been adverse."

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(Breland v. Traylor Eng'g & Mfg. Co. (1942) 52 Cal. App. 2d 415, 426; see also Maaso v. Signer (2012) 203 Cal. App. 4th 362, 371; Hicks v. KNTV Television, Inc. (2008) 160 Cal. App. 4th 994, 1010.) Accordingly, should there be any failure of proof on CASE's part that can reasonably be attributed to the documents that were not produced by CalPERS, an adverse interest against CalPERS should be drawn on those points.

THE GRIEVANCE WAS TIMELY FILED II.

CASE filed the instant grievance on March 22, 2022. (J1, p. 2.) The grievance specifically identified March 17, 2022, as the date of action causing the grievance. (Ibid.) On that date, CalPERS sent CASE a letter responding to CASE's letter of March 7, 2022. (J1, p. 35.) The author of the letter, Julie Morgan, testified that during meet and confer sessions in the months preceding the CASE letter of March 7, CASE had consistently requested that its attorneys be allowed maximum flexibility regarding telework, and that they not be subject to any mandate to be in the office an arbitrary number of days per week. (RT 420, 423-424, 427.) The March 7 letter from CASE expressly asked CalPERS to reconsider that mandate. (J1, p. 34.) The March 22, 2022, CalPERS response expressly noted CASE's "request to expand telework for the attorneys." (J1, p. 36.) Thus, there is no doubt that the March 17, 2022, letter from CalPERS was denying the request made by CASE for maximum telework flexibility for its members at CalPERS. The March 7, 2022, letter from CASE was different in one material respect from the prior meet and confer sessions: it was specifically addressed to CalPERS CEO Marcie Frost. (J1, p. 32.)⁵ Thus, the March 17, 2022, response from CalPERS represents the official and final denial of CASE's request from the highest-ranking person at CalPERS. Having exhausted all available remedies, CASE then filed the instant grievance five days later.

Article 7 of the MOU specifies the grievance and arbitration procedure. (J2, p. 34.) In general, the MOU provides that CASE must file a grievance within 21 days of the incident giving rise to the grievance, or 21 days from the denial of the grievance at the previous level. (See, e.g., MOU Secs. 7.7.A.2, 7.8, 7.9.A; J2, pp. 34-36.) The instant grievance was filed at the department

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⁵ Ms. Morgan was cc'd on the letter. (J1, p. 34.)

level as it was an all-affected grievance on behalf of all BU2 members at CalPERS. Since it was filed within 5 days of the March 17, 2022, letter from CalPERS, it was timely filed.

CalPERS' own conduct supports the conclusion that timeliness is not at issue. Neither the March 17, 2022, response to CASE's March 7, 2022 letter, nor the April 21, 2022 formal denial of the grievance asserted untimeliness; rather, both addressed CASE's claims on the merits. Accordingly, since CalPERS treated the grievance as being timely filed, the State cannot now assert that it was not.

III. CASE'S REQUEST FOR TELEWORK WAS PROPER UNDER SECTION 6.4

Section 1.1.C of the MOU recognizes CASE as the exclusive representative of BU2. (J2, p. 10.) Section 1.1.A makes clear that the agreement is pursuant to the Dills Act, appearing at Government Code section 3512, et seq. (Ibid.) That very same Dills Act specifies that "[e]mployee organizations shall have the right to represent their members in their employment relations with the state." (Government Code section 3515.5.) Unions like CASE represent their members in a variety of ways. Sometimes they meet and confer with the employer on behalf of all their members which may include proposals to address the change in working conditions which the union was noticed on. (See, e.g., RT 422-424.) Sometimes they file "all-affected" grievances. (See, e.g., J1, p. 2.) And, as in this case, they sometimes make requests of management on behalf of all employees as part of the meet and confer process.

Section 6.4 of the MOU provides as follows:

6.4 Telework

- A. The State and CASE recognize that telework has been proven to improve employee morale, reduce traffic congestion and improve productivity.
- B. Employee requests to telework shall not be denied except for operational needs.

When teleworking requests are denied, the reason shall be put in writing, if requested by the employee. Employees who believe their request to telework was denied in violation of this subsection, may file a grievance that can be appealed to the fourth level of the grievance procedure.

CalPERS may argue that in this specific situation, only the individual employee – and not CASE acting on their behalf – can make a request for telework under section 6.4 of the MOU. While it is true that the language of section 6.4 refers to "employee requests," it does not contain

any language indicating that employees may not make such requests through their exclusive representative.

More importantly, the very argument CalPERS is making has been rejected by the superior court. Specifically, in the Minute Order compelling the parties to arbitrate this grievance, the court found as follows:

Alternatively, CalHR argues in opposition that the petition must be denied as Section 6.4 only covers "individual employee requests" for telework, and not "requests for wholesale changes to the state's telework policies." (Oppos., p. 17: 21-22.) According to CalHR, because the grievances here are brought by CASE on behalf of all BU2 employees, such requests would not constitute "individual" employee requests to telework as covered by Section 6.4. (Oppos., p. 18: 5-10.) This argument is not well taken.

As CASE aptly highlights in reply, Section 7.2 expressly provides that a "grievance is a dispute between the State and CASE, or between the State and one or more employees, involving the interpretation, application, or enforcement of the express terms of this MOU." (MOU, § 7.2.A.) Considering this language, the Court is not persuaded that the sole fact the grievances are brought by CASE on behalf of multiple employees would otherwise exempt applicability of Section 6.4.

(U15, p. 7, emphasis added.) As the highlighted language from the court's opinion indicates, the State already tried this argument, and it was rejected. Inasmuch as the Parties were the same⁶ and the issue was the same, the issue is res judicata and cannot be adjudicated in CalPERS' favor in this proceeding. (*Ass'n of Irritated Residents v. Dep't of Conservation* (2017) 11 Cal. App. 5th 1202, 1219 [describing the elements of res judicata].) Alternatively, but to the same effect, the determination that CASE's requests on behalf of all of its members is sufficient to trigger section 6.4 of the MOU is law of the case. (*People v. Stanley* (1995) 10 Cal. 4th 764, 786 [explaining that the law of the case doctrine applies to civil as well as criminal matters, and dictates that a court's adjudication of an issue in the case must be adhered to throughout all subsequent phases of litigation].)

Thus, there can be no doubt that CASE's various requests on behalf of its members for maximum telework constituted a valid "employee request" under section 6.4 of the MOU. To hold otherwise would upset decades of statutory and decisional law clearly holding that unions can

⁶ Counsel for the Union and the State for arbitration of this matter was the same as for the Motion to Compel Arbitration . (See U15, p. 9.)

act on behalf of their members.

CalPERS may nevertheless argue that CASE did not follow CalPERS' internal procedure for making modifications to employee telework schedules. (See, e.g., RT 428-429.)⁷ But as the evidence in this case made clear, employees were told repeatedly that the mandate to be in the office three days per week was across the board, applicable to everyone. CEO Marcie Frost said so in her town hall web chats. (See, e.g., RT 478.) General Counsel Matt Jacobs made clear that the three/two hybrid schedule applied to everyone. (RT 236.) The attorneys who testified understood it was a mandatory requirement, and not optional. (RT 28.) Some attorneys even left because of the directive. (RT 118, 193-196.) It was clear that everyone understood it would be futile to request more telework beyond the two days per week allowed under the mandatory, department-wide policy. As such, any failure of individual employees or CASE to fill out the specific CalPERS forms designated for requesting modifications to telework schedules is inconsequential. Doing so would have been an idle act. (*Gueyffier v. Ann Summers, Ltd.* (2008) 43 Cal. 4th 1179, 1185 [upholding arbitrator's decision to excuse nonperformance of a contractual condition when it would be an idle act to do so].)

Finally, any argument that the rights and obligations of section 6.4 were not triggered by CASE's requests on behalf of its members is belied by CalPERS' own response to CASE. In the April 21, 2022, denial of the grievance, CalPERS General Counsel Matt Jacobs took pains to articulate the various operational needs that purportedly justified the mandate to be in the office three days per week. (J1, pp. 40-46.) The primary "rights and obligations" of section 6.4 are to have operational needs stated, in writing, for any telework request that is denied. CalPERS' response to the grievance indicates quite clearly that it believed those rights and obligations were triggered, because it responded *exactly as required by the MOU*. As such, any argument now that such rights and obligations were not triggered lacks credibility. Moreover, the conduct of the parties after execution of the contract can be considered in construing the meaning of disputed

⁷ It is apparent from CalPERS' own witness that it does not believe rigid adherence to its telework policies are actually required, as Ms. Morgan acknowledged that CalPERS had failed to follow the policy with regard to analyzing which job classifications were suitable for telework. (RT 435-437.)

contractual provisions. (*Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Shewry* (2006) 137 Cal. App. 4th 964, 983.) Thus, CalPERS' act of treating the grievance as though it triggered the rights and obligations of section 6.4 is persuasive evidence that the Parties intended that to be the case.

For all of the foregoing reasons, CASE's request to CalPERS triggered the rights and obligations of section 6.4.

IV. CALPERS FAILED TO IDENTIFY ANY OPERATIONAL NEEDS SUPPORTING THE DENIAL OF MAXIMUM TELEWORK FLEXIBILITY FOR BU2 MEMBERS

As explained more specifically below, the testimony elicited at the hearing revealed the following. All of the rank-and-file attorneys who testified explained that their work at CalPERS was largely solo in nature and could be accomplished at home just as well, if not better, as in the office. They also explained that they were able to communicate and collaborate with their colleagues using the telephone, email, text message, or virtual platforms like Zoom, Teams, and Webex, even when they were in the office. CalPERS management, on the other hand, reluctantly conceded that employees could communicate virtually, but opined that it just was not quite as good as in person, even if they could not identify any particular operational need that was unmet during the two years that attorneys were working fully remotely.

A. THE LANGUAGE OF SECTION 6.4 PUTS THE BURDEN ON CALPERS TO DEMONSTRATE AN OPERATIONAL NEED

While CASE is the grievant and ordinarily has the burden to prove a violation of the MOU, the instant case presents a situation where the language of the MOU effectively puts the burden on the employer. Specifically, MOU section 6.4.A first sets forth the parties' agreement as to the effect of telework: it improves morale, reduces traffic congestion and improves productivity. Then, with that context, section 6.4.B states "Employee requests to telework shall not be denied except for operational needs." This language indicates that the default rule is for telework requests to be granted, unless the exception applies. In other words, the employer must grant a telework request unless operational needs justify a denial.

But in order for this language to mean anything, the phrase "operational needs" must actually mean something. The phrase is not otherwise defined in the MOU. Here, CalPERS proffers an interpretation that would render the phrase meaningless. CalPERS Labor Relations

Manager Julie Morgan testified that because section 6.4 did not define "operational needs," the State had the right to enact whatever mandate it deemed appropriate. (RT 441, 455.) CalPERS General Counsel made this position even more clear in his letter denying CASE's grievance.

Now CalPERS recognizes, as the Grievance points out, that section 6.4 of the MOU provides that "requests for telework shall not be denied except for operational needs." But management determines those operational needs within the broader framework of its authority as set out in section 3.1(B) and California law. With this proper framework in mind, we turn to CalPERS' operational needs, which management has determined currently require its attorneys to be in the office at least three days a week.

(J1, p. 41.) Thus, according to CalPERS, it is unilaterally entitled to determine the operational needs. But this cannot be the rule. If the State can assert any operational need whatsoever, then the exception becomes nugatory. For example, if CalPERS asserted an "operational need" to have "butts-in-seats" (see J1, p. 34) then it could use that supposed operational need to justify denying any and all telework requests. Contractual terms must not be interpreted in a way to render any clauses nugatory. (*City of Atascadero v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.* (1998) 68 Cal. App. 4th 445, 473.)

On the contrary, where a contractual term is not defined, it must be given its ordinary and popular meaning. (Santisas v. Goodin (1998) 17 Cal. 4th 599, 609 [interpreting the term "prevailing party" which was otherwise undefined in the contract].) According to Webster, "operational" is defined as "of, relating to, or based on operations." (https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/operational). And "operations," in turn, is defined as "performance of a practical work or of something involving the practical application of principles or processes." (https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/operations). Thus, the term "operational" denotes something related to performing work. It does not denote any particular social friendships that may develop incidental to performing work.

Turning to the second word in the phrase, "need" denotes something that is required, as opposed to something that is merely desired or preferred. In this respect, it is important to note that a "need" is different than a "want." Thus, combining the two words, the phrase "operational

⁸ See generally, "You Can't Always Get What You Want" (1969) M. Jagger & K. Richards.

need" must be interpreted to mean something that is required in order to perform the work.

Thus, to qualify as an exception to the default rule that telework requests should be granted, a State department must articulate a reason why the work cannot be performed without being physically in the office.

B. CALPERS' VARIOUS ASSERTED OPERATIONAL NEEDS ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE

In the denial of the grievance, and during testimony at the arbitration, CalPERS asserted five categories of operational needs that it claimed supported the denial of CASE's request for maximum telework on behalf of its members. Each will be discussed in turn.

1. The Operational Need to Maintain and Improve CALPERS Culture is so Subjective That it Is Rendered Meaningless

CalPERS' first asserted operational need refers to "culture", but that term is never clearly defined, and even when aspects of "culture" are defined, they are internally inconsistent. CalPERS General Counsel Matt Jacobs explained "culture" as involving everyone having the same mission, and he also claimed that it meant ensuring that his team had high ethical standards. (RT 223.) He also claimed it meant his attorneys treat adversaries with the utmost respect. (RT 223-224.) He claimed that team bonds weakened while people were working fully remotely, due to a lack of physical contact. (RT 224.)

However, he acknowledged that there was no way to quantitatively measure whether CalPERS employees have a common sense of mission. (RT 255.) Instead, he claimed it was based on management's "sense" and "inputs from [] team members about the extent to which they are working together." (RT 256.) He admitted that during the two years of fully remote work, from March 2020 through March 2022, he never communicated to his attorneys that he had noticed a deterioration in the collective sense of mission. (RT 256-257.) Neither did he believe that ethical standards suffered during that same two-year period. (RT 257.) He also admitted that he had no knowledge that his attorneys were not treating adversaries with respect. (RT 258.) With regard to weakening bonds, he also admitted that he was unaware of how frequently his team members communicated with each other during the pandemic but claimed that in-person communication was qualitatively better than telephone, email, and Zoom calls. (RT 258-259.) He

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also admitted when the attorneys returned to the office three days per week, he saw no improvement in ethical standards, and no change in the respect given to adversaries (RT 260.)

In short, Mr. Jacobs was unable to identify any element of "culture" that deteriorated in any way during the two years of working fully remote during the pandemic. At most, he conveyed that his own subjective sense was that the culture was different than it was prior to the pandemic. But that mere difference is not enough to establish an operational need. Indeed, even if it was accepted that the culture was objectively worse with full-time telework than it was before the pandemic – a proposition CASE does not concede and which the State failed to prove – CalPERS' argument would still fail. This is so for two reasons. First, CalPERS adduced no evidence that the mandate to return to the office three days per week would meaningfully improve the culture. This failure was partly due to the inarticulate definition of culture that was offered by CalPERS, and the fact that by CalPERS' own admission, there is no way to measure culture. But the notion was actually affirmatively disproven by the evidence in the record. Multiple attorneys left CalPERS precisely because of the return to office mandate. The vacancy rates for attorneys after the mandate was implemented were unprecedented and higher than anyone could recall. (RT 34, 98-99, 204-205.) The attorneys who remained had very low morale and were unhappy due to the telework policy. (RT 38.) The vacancy rate in the legal unit was so high that more work than ever before was being sent over to the DOJ. (RT 307.) Whatever culture means, the evidence demonstrates that the culture got worse as a result of the return to office mandate.

Second, CalPERS failed to establish that an improved culture was *necessary to the operations*, as opposed to simply desired as a nice working environment. While it may be preferable to have a positive culture at the workplace, it is by no means essential or necessary. Many people can attest to having been employed in worksites where the culture is toxic, or otherwise not conducive to forming close personal relationships. That is fundamentally different from a workplace that fails to perform its mission. Indeed, in many cases, a highly regimented workplace may be very efficient at performing its mission, even if the employees are unhappy or don't like the "culture." Thus, for multiple reasons, the notion that "culture" justifies CalPERS' denial of maximum telework must be rejected.

2. The Operational Need to Maintain and Increase Collaboration is Not Supported by The Evidence

General Counsel Matt Jacobs acknowledged that most of the work done by the attorneys was solo but claimed that what was left was collaborative work. (RT 260-261.) However, the attorneys testified their work was almost all solo, except for occasionally consulting with supervisors; there was no co-counsel assigned to their cases. (RT 24-25, 114.) But even if that factual discrepancy is resolved in CalPERS' favor, Mr. Jacobs acknowledged that collaboration could be done on a virtual platform like Zoom or Teams but claimed that the communication on such platform was not as good. (RT 261-262.) Specifically, he acknowledged that attorneys could collaborate over Zoom, over email and over the telephone. (RT 275-276.) However, he claimed the "volume" of collaboration was not as high, although he was unable to specify how much worse it was than in person. (RT 276.) Thus, CalPERS was unable to offer any quantifiable or articulable difference between in-person collaboration and remote collaboration, but simply insisted that in-person was better. CalPERS was unable to say how much better it was, and of course was unable to show how the difference – however great or small it was – actually impeded CalPERS' ability to carry out its mission or effectively collaborate.

The truth that emerged from the testimony is that Mr. Jacobs is somewhat old-fashioned and prefers in-person communication and some of the behavioral interactions associated with that, but he also admitted that he failed to even try to replicate those behavioral interactions in the remote setting. For example, with regard to the difference between in-person meetings, and Zoom meetings, he acknowledged that often before the in-person meeting starts, people will chit-chat with each other. Yet, he never tried to incorporate that into the Zoom meetings. (RT 280.) He also never tried to have his team members talk to each other over Zoom without him being present. (RT 280-281.) Although he claimed that some people appeared uninvolved during zoom meetings, he never adopted strategies to get them more involved. (RT 281-282.)

He claimed that a "social norm developed" where people didn't just pick up the phone and call a colleague, and thus there was no equivalent to just popping into someone's office. (RT 228.) However, he admitted that he never did anything to try to break that social norm, like calling attorneys at random just to simulate popping into their office. (RT 282-283.) He admitted he

never encouraged his attorneys to make more use of group emails to ask questions of the whole group. (RT 284-285.)

Despite claiming to want to replicate causal conversations that occur when popping into a colleague's office, he admitted that he never tried to replicate that on Zoom by, for example, asking about a colleague's cat when it appeared on screen, as he might do if they were both in the office. (RT 285-287.) He claimed it was difficult to do such things on Zoom, and that he was mostly focused on moving through his agenda. (RT 286-287.) And it is this last admission that is most telling, because it illustrates the difference between an operational need, and a mere preference. By his own admission, he used his Zoom meetings to focus on the substance of the work and the agenda he wanted to discuss with his attorneys; he did not devote time to "chit-chat" or other non-substantive topics. In other words, he met the operational needs of the office without replicating – or even attempting to replicate – those in-person interactions that he claims are so important. His own conduct demonstrates that the type and nature of the collaboration he claims was missing during remote work was not in fact essential, and thus it was not an operational need.

3. The Operational Need to Maintain Productivity is Illusory Because Productivity Did Not Suffer During Full-Time Remote Work

The "productivity" argument is perhaps the most disingenuous one put forward by CalPERS, as the evidence – most of it from management's own words – demonstrates that there was no decline in productivity for attorneys or anyone else.

CalPERS' initial attempt to demonstrate a decline in productivity appeared in the March 17, 2022, letter from Julie Morgan, where she claimed that the Service Level Agreement ("SLA") was met 97% of the time in the year prior to the pandemic, but fell to 85% during the pandemic. (J1, p. 36.) That would arguably be statistically significant evidence of a decrease in productivity, if it were true. In his April 21, 2022, letter denying CASE's grievance, Mr. Jacobs did not even mention SLA at all, and instead admitted that there is no quantitative measure of attorney productivity. (J1, p. 45.) Moreover, in his testimony he acknowledged that the SLA deadline was a purely internal deadline, and failing to meet it had no real consequences. (RT 295-296.) Moreover, multiple witnesses testified that the SLA rule was suspended during COVID, so the

procedure for seeking an exemption was not used. So, the decline in SLA rate is not a fair measure of the loss of productivity. The reason CalPERS attorneys are not meeting SLA deadlines currently is due to low staffing. (RT 43-47.) Also, because SLA was suspended, there was no reason or incentive to use the exemption list. (RT 133-134.) CalPERS General Counsel Matt Jacobs agreed. (RT 296.)

Thus, the sole quantifiable metric initially offered by CalPERS regarding a decline in productivity was affirmatively disavowed by Mr. Jacobs and was proven to be a non-issue. Instead, CalPERS pivoted to a rather novel definition of productivity. Specifically, Mr. Jacobs claimed that uniform policies lead to a better product, and a better product means better productivity. (RT 232-233.) Despite this rather tautological definition, he admitted he had no metrics showing there was a decrease in productivity in the legal office. (RT 287.) He had no quantitative evidence of any decrease in productivity. (RT 324.) Instead, he claimed that his research led him to believe that there was something called qualitative productivity. (RT 350.) However, he immediately admitted that CalPERS did not do any of the scientific work mentioned in the articles he researched to establish a qualitative difference in productivity. (RT 351.)⁹

Not only did CalPERS fail to offer any evidence of a decline in productivity, but CalPERS CEO Marcie Frost also repeatedly claimed that productivity increased during full-time remote work. In her town hall web chats, she claimed that productivity was up, and all the numbers were positive. (U4, p. 1; U4, p. 7; U5, p. 23.) She tried to minimize these statements by claiming she was only talking about part of the organization even though she did not say anything to limit it in any way. (RT 499-504.) She also acknowledged previously saying that she knew full-time telework worked for half of the organization, and believed it worked for the other half. (RT 506-507.) Despite being asked about how the productivity for attorneys dropped during the pandemic, she was unable to identify any metric, or even any example, other than to state that productivity is different during a health pandemic. (RT 508-511.) Thus, from the very mouth of the CEO of CalPERS, it is clear that productivity was not affected by remote work.

⁹ He did repeatedly reference an employee survey that was never entered into evidence.

The only evidence that could possibly be characterized as a decline in "qualitative productivity" was offered by Deputy General Counsel Renee Salazar. She claimed that the quality of legal writing had in some instances deteriorated, but she gave no specific examples and later clarified that it just meant she had to edit some documents; it was not enough to give any attorneys a counseling memo. (RT 408.) She never even offered any examples of this alleged deterioration, nor did she describe the frequency with which it occurred. Her testimony, including the lack of detail, when compared to the testimony of Mr. Jacobs and Ms. Frost, is not credible and in any event amounts to, at best, a de minimis change in productivity, as she defines that term. This de minimis change, if believed, could not possibly be so great as to establish that the operations of the organization could not be met.

In sum, CalPERS not only failed to prove that full-time telework reduced productivity, the evidence actually proved the converse, i.e. that full-time telework led to high productivity. Moreover, CalPERS failed to show that any change in productivity – whether quantitative, qualitative, or something else – impacted the ability of CalPERS to operate. In other words, they failed to show that it was an operational need to warrant denying telework to attorneys.

4. The Operational Need to Assimilate New Team Members is Belied By CALPERS' Own In-Office Policy

CalPERS' next asserted operational need relates to onboarding new employees. (J1, p. 46.) Specifically, CalPERS claims that being in the office makes team members easier to reach, introduces new team members to CalPERS' culture, and boosts team member engagement. Putting aside the fact that this purported justification is built – at least in part – upon the "culture" justification, which was already debunked, this justification fails as an operational need for several reasons.

First, and most obviously, the policy requires team members to be in the office three days per week, but allows each employee to choose their own three days. Thus, some people's schedules will only overlap by at most one day. (RT 393.) If CalPERS truly believed that onboarding required exposure to other employees every day, then CalPERS would require all employees to be in the office five days per week. The fact that it requires only three in-office days

– and allows great inconsistency in which days are chosen by the employees – undercuts the notion that new employees need to have constant in-person interaction with their colleagues. Indeed, Deputy General Counsel Salazar acknowledged that even with the in-office mandate, there is still a lot of communication by telephone or virtual platforms simply because not everyone is in the office on the same days. (RT 393-394.)

Second, there was evidence that training could be done remotely, in-person, or in a hybrid fashion, with no change in effectiveness. (RT 72-73; RT 155; RT 176.) Even Mr. Delacruz, who was hired during the pandemic and required to come into the office five days per week, did most of his training virtually. (RT 194.)

While it is true that Mr. Jacobs claimed that training and mentoring suffered during full-time telework, he again offered no evidence, metrics, or anything to support his assertion. (RT 233-234.) However, he admitted that the mentoring and information exchange could be done over the phone or via Zoom. (RT 288.) Moreover, John Shipley an attorney at CalPERS from 2015 to 2023, regularly mentored younger and new to CalPERS attorneys, and his ability to do so was not affected by remote work, because even before COVID, he would often communicate via phone or email rather than in person. (RT 113, 120-121.) Thus, multiple attorneys testified that they both received and provided training or mentoring in person and virtually, with no material difference in quality. This evidence undermines Mr. Jacobs' bare assertion that in-person training is so significantly better that it amounts to an operational need. Telling in this regard is the fact that CalPERS failed to offer one iota of evidence indicating that there were any training deficiencies during the two years of fully remote work. While Mr. Jacobs may prefer in-person training, a preference is not a need. This purported justification must be rejected.

5. The Operational Need to Have the Same Requirements Apply to All Team Members Does Not Withstand Scrutiny

The final purported justification for denying full-time telework is at once both utterly believable and completely incoherent. There is little doubt that CEO Marcie Frost made an executive determination to apply the three day in-office requirement across the board, out of some sense of fairness. Matt Jacobs asked the CEO to provide an extra day of telework to the attorneys,

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because he was losing attorneys as a result of the three-day—in-office mandate. (RT 239.) He also recognized that the morale of the attorneys was suffering. (RT 240-241.) CEO Frost denied the request based on "fairness," i.e. the idea that if an exception was made for attorneys, other units might make similar requests. (RT 241.)

But notwithstanding the fact that Ms. Frost sincerely wants her attorneys to be in the office three days per week along with every other employee, her sincere desire is insufficient to constitute an operational need. To begin with, it is clear that there is no operational need for "absolute" fairness, i.e. equal treatment for all employees, because some employees at CalPERS are in fact allowed to telework full-time. (RT 237-239.) Not only were call center employees allowed to telework full-time after the pandemic, but a group of IT workers who were only granted full-time telework prior to the pandemic due to a mistake. And while support staff apparently grumbled about attorneys being able to work fully remote during the height of the pandemic, CalPERS' own policy states that when evaluating "CalPERS must consider the nature of the work being performed and the business need" and look at the specifics of each job classification. (J4, p. 3; RT 434-435.) Thus, CalPERS' own policy contemplates there may be some job classifications that are more suited to telework than others, which of course may lead to grumbling. But regardless of the grumbling, the point is that the very policy enacted by CalPERS relating to telework expressly contemplated that not all employees would be treated the same. And yet treating everyone the same appears to have been the paramount consideration for CalPERS management.

Nor can Mr. Jacobs' testimony about the value of fairness be given much weight, as it was he who acknowledged that he thought operational needs could be met by the attorneys if they were given an extra day of telework. The supposed operational need for fairness and equal treatment is irreconcilable with a determination that attorneys could meet operational needs with more telework than other employees. In short, CalPERS cannot have it both ways. Either everyone – truly everyone – must be treated the same, or it needs to develop a policy that does not expressly contemplate that people will be treated differently. Either operational needs require attorneys to be in the office three days per week, as was stated in the April 21, 2022 grievance denial, or

operational needs can be met with attorneys in the office only two days per week, as Mr. Jacobs determined after he began hemorrhaging attorneys. CalPERS' inconsistent statements, contradictory testimony, and incoherent articulations of policy make it clear that there is no operational need served by requiring attorneys to be in the office three days per week.

C. THE ABSENCE OF ANY OPERATIONAL NEED DEMONSTRATES THAT THE DENIAL OF FULL-TIME TELEWORK WAS A VIOLATION OF THE MOU

CalPERS has had two full years to come up with operational needs to justify its denial of full-time telework for the attorneys, which, ironically, is almost exactly the same amount of time that attorneys did in fact work fully remote during the COVID-19 pandemic. Despite those many months, CalPERS has failed to offer any operational need that withstands scrutiny. CEO Frost was asked to name one operational need that suffered during the pandemic, and she failed to articulate a single operational need that was not met while attorneys were working fully remotely. (RT 495-498.) In light of the evidence in the record, a finding that CalPERS violated section 6.4 of the MOU is compelled.

V. CALPERS ALSO VIOLATED SECTION 3.1.B OF THE MOU BY FAILING TO UNIFORMLY APPLY ITS TELEWORK POLICY TO ALL SIMILARLY SITUATED EMPLOYEES

Although CalPERS has advanced consistency and uniformity as an operational need (see *supra*), its argument demonstrates a separate and independent violation of the MOU. Section 3.1.B provides in pertinent part as follows:

The State has the right to make reasonable rules and regulations pertaining to employees consistent with this MOU provided that any such rule shall be uniformly applied to all affected employees who are similarly situated.

The key to determine whether disparate treatment is a violation under this section lies in determining which employees are similarly situated to each other. In this case, that task is easy. CalPERS CEO Marcie Frost made clear that the in-office mandate was applicable to the entire organization. (RT 474.) She acknowledged CalPERS did not do an analysis of each job classification to determine its suitability for telework and was not aware of anyone at CalPERS who did. (RT 489.) Deputy General Counsel Renee Salazar echoed Ms. Frost's sentiments when she characterized the three-day-in-office mandate as "equality issue for the larger organization."

(RT 392.)

Thus, from CalPERS' perspective, for telework purposes, all employees are the same. All employees are similarly situated in that they all are required to be in the office three days per week, regardless of job duties. However, by CalPERS' own admission, some employees are nevertheless allowed full-time telework, based at least in part on their job duties or other considerations. (RT 237-239.) But if all employees are similarly situated, how can it be that some employees are exempted from the across-the-board mandate? Obviously, they cannot be exempted without violating section 3.1.B.

Accordingly, by insisting so strenuously and so consistently that all employees in the entire organization must be treated fairly and equally, but exempting some employees from the mandate, CalPERS has simultaneously established that all employees are similarly situated while also establishing a violation of section 3.1.B. CalPERS may argue that the IT workers and the call center employees have duties that are particularly suited for telework. That may be true, but it merely begs the question: if CalPERS engaged in the type of job-specific analysis of those employees – the kind of analysis the CalPERS Telework Policy expressly requires – then why did it not engage in the same analysis for the attorneys? There is no answer other than to acknowledge a violation of section 3.1.B.

VI. THE EXTENDED AND CONTINUING NATURE OF THE VIOLATIONS OF THE MOU REQUIRE EXTRAORDINARY REMEDIES

COVID undeniably changed all our lives in countless ways. Millions of people began to use remote platforms like Zoom or Teams, and began to use new services like Door Dash and other delivery platforms for food, groceries and other essentials. Many people moved their homes, changed schools for their children, sold cars that were no longer needed for commuting, and made countless other major life changes. ¹⁰ Before the pandemic, many people did not believe it was possible to work fully remotely. The years of COVID lockdowns, combined with new

¹⁰ During the two years of working fully remotely, some attorneys at CalPERS actually moved their residence as a result of the ability to work from anywhere and were understandably upset when the return to office mandate was announced. (RT 33; 69-70.)

technology, exploded that myth. What was once unthinkable suddenly became very possible.

One of the truths that emerged from two years of COVID-19 was that the work of the attorneys at CalPERS was very conducive to full-time or nearly full-time telework. But rather than learning that lesson and taking some good out of the disaster that was the COVID pandemic, CalPERS has arbitrarily insisted that attorneys come into the office three days per week in violation of sections 6.4 and 3.1.B of the MOU. This mandate caused a whole new round of disruption in the lives of attorneys who were just settling in to a new normal. Since these violations have been ongoing for two years, any remedy must be comprehensive enough to remediate the damage that has already been done and to ensure the rights guaranteed in the MOU are protected moving forward.

First, CalPERS must immediately inform attorneys, that notwithstanding the general department-wide mandate, they are permitted to telework up to five days per week, with the express caveat that they are required to come into the office whenever it is necessary to complete their job duties. This exception would include things like attending in-person court or administrative hearings, attending CalPERS Board meetings, defending in-person depositions, and working with colleagues in person on projects for which virtual meetings are too cumbersome or counterproductive, like organizing trial exhibits with one's legal secretary.

Second, all attorneys should be paid \$600 in compensation for being denied eligibility for the \$50 per month stipend for the period of two years, since the in-office mandate only qualified attorneys for the \$25 dollar per month stipend.

Third, CalPERS shall entertain claims from attorneys for costs incurred in connection with complying with the in-office mandate for two years, including costs associated with commuting, parking, moving expenses, etc. These costs shall be itemized and submitted on a standard expense claim form, with receipts attached, and processed by CalPERS as it would process any other claim for expense reimbursement.

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1	DATED: March 18, 2024	THE LAW OFFICE OF PATRICK WHALEN
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5		By:PATRICK J. WHALEN
6		Attorney for All Affected Grievants
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GRIEVANTS' CLOSING BRIEF